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On the Structure of the Set of
Correlated Equilibria
in two-by-two Bimatrix Games
Ronald Peeters Jos Pottersy
May 1999
Abstract
The paper studies the structure of the set of correlated equilibria for 22-bimatrix
games. We nd that the extreme points of the (convex) set of correlated equilibria
can be determined very easily from the Nash equilibria of the game.
JEL Classication: C72.
Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; bimatrix game.
1 Introduction.
In certain classes of strategic games the players have partially common interests and they
may fear that `just playing a Nash equilibrium' does not do justice to the common interests.
In such games it may be wise to introduce a cooperative pre-play meeting to coordinate
the actions of the dierent players. The concept of correlated equilibria is based on this
idea (see Auman (1974) and (1987)). It gives a method to coordinate the actions of the
players before the game is played.
The idea is the following: in the pre-play meeting the players agree upon a (nite) proba-
bility space 
 with probability measure p and signalling functions xi: 
 ! Ti, one for each
player.
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If the game is played, a chance mechanism with probability distribution p (out of the reach
of any player) determines a point ! 2 
 and each player i get the information xi(!) 2 Ti.
Now each player i chooses an action ai in his action space Ai and the payos ui(a1; : : : ; an)
follow. The dierence with playing the original strategic game (fAi; uigi2N) is that the
players can choose strategies fi:Ti ! Ai, the players can react to the signal they get.
During the pre-play meeting the players transformed the strategic game (fAi; uigi2N) into
a Bayesian game (
; p; fxi; Tigi2N ; fAi; uigi2N).
A Bayesian equilibrium in the extended game is called a correlated equilibrium of the
strategic game (fAi; uigi2N). Note that the signal is costless and is only used to `coordinate'
the actions.
Suppose that ffigi2N is a Bayesian equilibrium in the game
(
; p; fxi; Tigi2N ; fAi; uigi2N );
then we can introduce a new set 
:= A1   An and a new probability measure p on 

dened by p(a1; : : : ; an): = p [f! 2 
 : fi  xi(!) = aig]. We also introduce new signalling
functions, namely xi(a1; : : : ; an): = ai.
So, in the pre-play meeting the players agree upon a chance distribution over the strategy
proles, before the game is played a strategy prole is drawn at random and each player gets
as a signal his component of this strategy prole ai, the `strategy he is supposed to play'.
`Following the advice', i.e. playing ai if you are told to do so, is a Bayesian equilibrium
in the new situation and generates the same outcome, the same chance distribution over
A = A1     An, as the old Bayesian equilibrium ffig did (see Osborne and Rubinstein
(1994) for a proof). As the chance distribution over A is the only thing that matters, the
players do not need fancy chance mechanisms (
; p) and signalling functions fxig, they
can get the same outcome by taking 
 = A and signalling functions xi(a) = ai. What they
have to discuss is the probability distribution p on A. So, the set of correlated equilibria
consists of all probability measures p 2 (A) for which the reaction functions `following
the advice you get' form a Bayesian equilibrium. Note that `following the advice you get'
generates the probability distribution p as outcome and payos
P
a2A p(a) ui(a) for each
player i. So, after all the discussion during the pre-play meeting was about the outcome.
After the previous discussion we are left with the following situation: during the cooperative
phase of the game the players (try to) agree upon an element p 2 (A). During the
game each player gets the advice to play a certain action. If they do so, the probability
distribution p is generated and the question remains if it is wise to follow the instructions.
Is the situation self-enforcing in the sense that no unilateral deviation is a better action
for the deviating player?
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In this paper we study the set of correlated equilibria for the most simple situation, for
2  2-bimatrix games. We nd a very easy way to derive the set of correlated equilibria
from the set of Nash equilibria.
For these games there are two well-known facts:
(i) the set of correlated equilibria is a convex polyhedron,
(ii) Nash equilibria `are' correlated equilibria.
From these facts follows that the set of correlated equilibria contains the convex hull of
the set of Nash equilibria. So we are interested in extreme points of the set of correlated
equilibria that are not Nash equilibria.
We prove that such points exist if and only if the 2 2-bimatrix game has three isolated
Nash equilibria, two pure and one mixed Nash equilibrium (it is a game like the `Battle
of the Sexes') and that the extreme points of the set of correlated equilibria can be found
from the coordinates of the mixed equilibrium.
2 Correlated equilibria for bimatrix games.
Let (A;B) be the payo matrices of a bimatrix game of size mn. Let Z = (zij)  0 be a
probability vector on the entries (i; j). So,
P
ij zij = 1. We rst write down the conditions
that Z must satisfy to be a self-enforcing solution. If the signal ei is given, the conditional
expected payo of playing ei must be at least as large as the conditional expected payo










for every alternative strategy ek. This means:X
j
zij [Aij   Akj]  0 for all k 6= i:
For the other player we nd thatX
i
zij [Bij   Bi`]  0 for all ` 6= j:
If we add the (in)equalities





we have a description of the set Z(A;B) of correlated equilibria of the bimatrix game
(A;B) as a compact polyhedral set. So calculating Z(A;B) is the same as calculating the
extreme points of Z(A;B). In Evangelista and Raghavan (1996) it is proved that each
extreme point of a maximal Nash set1 is an extreme point of Z(A;B) too.
Lemma 1 (i) A Nash equilibrium (p; q) denes a correlated equilibrium by zij: = pi qj.
(ii) A correlated equilibrium Z = (zij) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if zij zk` = zi` zkj
for all strategies i; k for player 1 and all strategies j; ` for player 2.
Proof (i) If (p; q) is a Nash equilibrium, we have, for every i; k and j; `
pi > 0 implies eiAq  ek Aq and qj > 0 implies pB ej  pB e`:






















These are the inequalities we looked for:X
j
zij [Aij   Akj]  0 and
X
i
zij [Bij   Bi`]  0 for all i; k and all j; `:
(ii) If Z = (zij) is a correlated equilibria satisfying all equalities zij zk` = zi` zkj, we take








Clearly, p and q are well-dened strategies for player 1 and 2, respectively (the denominators
















Every product pk q` is a product of zk` and a constant (since i and j are xed). This
constant is one, since pk q` as well as zk` add up to one. Then pk q` = zk` for all k and ` and
the Nash equilibrium conditions follow from the conditions for correlated equilibria e.g.:
pi [eiAq   ek Aq] =
X
j
(Aij   Akj) zij  0:
This completes the proof. /
The following lemma will help in the analysis of the next section.
1A Nash subset is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria with the exchangeability property. If a Nash
set is maximal with respect to inclusion, it is a maximal Nash set.
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Lemma 2 The set of correlated equilibria of a bimatrix game (A;B) does not change if
the A-matrix is multiplied with a positive factor or a xed row vector is added to all rows
of A. The B-matrix can also be multiplied with any positive factor and any xed column
vector can be added to all columns of B without changing the set of correlated equilibria.
Proof It is easy to see that the operations proposed give an equivalent system of linear
inequalities with the same solution set. /
By use of the transformations proposed in Lemma 2 we are able to transform bimatrix
games (A;B) into games (A0; B0) which are strategically equivalent, that is the best reply
correspondences and therefore for instance the set of Nash equilibria do not change.
3 Correlated Equilibria for 2 2-bimatrix games.











By using Lemma 2 we can transform these matrices into the matrices (A0; B0) with the











where i = a1i   a2i and j = bj1   bj2. The inequalities describing the set Z(A;B) =
Z(A0; B0) are
1z11 + 2z12  0 (1)
 1z21   2z22  0 (2)
1z11 + 2z21  0 (3)
 1z12   2z22  0 (4)
We know that the convex polyhedron Z(A0; B0) contains the convex hull of the set of Nash
equilibria E(A0; B0). To compute the set Z(A0; B0) it is sucient to nd all (extreme) points
of Z(A0; B0) that are not Nash equilibria, i.e. Z 2 Z(A0; B0) withD(Z): = z11z22 z12z21 6= 0
(see Lemma 1 (ii)).
Proposition 3 If Z(A0; B0) contains an element Z with D(Z) 6= 0, then (A0; B0) has at
least two pure Nash equilibria.
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Proof Let Z be a correlated equilibrium with D(Z) 6= 0. If we eliminate 2 from the
inequalities (1) and (2), i.e. multiply inequality (1) with z22 and inequality (2) with z12
and add we get 1D(Z)  0. Eliminating 1 gives 2D(Z)  0. Eliminating 2 and 1
from the inequalities (3) and (4) gives 1D(Z)  0 and 2D(Z)  0.
If D(Z) > 0, we nd 1; 1  0 and 2; 2  0. Then (e1; e1) and (e2; e2) are pure Nash
equilibria. In case D(Z) < 0 we nd that (e1; e2) and (e2; e1) are pure Nash equilibria. /
Corollary 4 If the bimatrix game (A0; B0) has exactly one, completely mixed Nash equilib-
rium or if one of the players has a strictly dominant strategy, then Z(A0; B0) = E(A0; B0).
Remark If there is a correlated equilibrium Z with D(Z) 6= 0, we may assume that

























So we assume from this moment that 1; 1  0 and 2; 2  0. The strategy pairs
(e1; e1) and (e2; e2) are Nash equilibria and all matrices Z with z12 = z21 = 0 are correlated
equilibria. We write a: = 1, a
0: =  2, b: = 1 and b
0: =  2. Then a, b, a
0 and b0  0 and












The inequalities describing the set Z(A00; B00) are
az11   a
0z12  0 (1)
0
 az21 + a
0z22  0 (2)
0
bz11   b
0z21  0 (3)
0
 bz12 + b
0z22  0 (4)
0
We rst consider the case that a+ a0 = 0 or b + b0 = 0.
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Proposition 5 If a+a0 = 0 or b+ b0 = 0, then Z(A00; B00) is the convex hull of E(A00; B00).
Proof If a + a0 = 0 and b + b0 = 0, both matrices are the 0-matrix and every strategy
prole is a Nash equilibrium. Then clearly, Z(A00; B00) = ch E(A00; B00). Next, we consider
the case a+ a0 = 0 and b+ b0 > 0. The case a+ a0 > 0 and b+ b0 = 0 is completely similar.
By multiplication of the B00-matrix with a positive factor we get b+ b0 = 1. The following






















Let Z be any correlated equilibrium with z12 + z21 > 0. We look for numbers u1  0 and
u2  0 such that Z   u1 Z1   u2Z2 has zeroes o the diagonal and nonnegative diagonal
entries. Then we must have z12 = u1 b
0 and z21 = u2 b.
If b0 = 0, we have by inequality (4)0 that z12 = 0 and if b = 0, we also have z21 = 0 by






in as far as these fractions are well-dened
and zero else. Also from (3)0 and (4)0 follows that
v1: = z11   u2 b








Accordingly we nd Z = v1E11 + v2E22 + u1 Z1 + u2 Z2. /
Note that up to this moment we did not nd any extreme point of Z(A00; B00) that is not
a Nash equilibrium. Only the last class of bimatrix games with a + a0 > 0 and b + b0 > 0
can provide us with such examples. We assume that a+ a0 = 1 and b + b0 = 1.




























Note that E11, E22 and Z0 are Nash equilibria. Z0 corresponds with the Nash equilibrium
p = (b0; b) and q = (a0; a).
Proposition 6 If a+ a0 > 0 and b+ b0 > 0, then
Z(A00; B00) = R+ [E11; E22; Z0; Z1; Z2] \ fZ j z11 + z12 + z21 + z22 = 1g
(the intersection of the positive cone generated by E11, E22, Z0, Z1 and Z2 and the hyper-
plane z11 + z12 + z21 + z22 = 1).
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Proof Again we assume that a+ a0 = 1 and b+ b0 = 1. Let Z be a correlated equilibrium
with z12+z21 > 0. We look for numbers u0, u1 and u2  0 such that Z u0Z0 u1 Z1 u2 Z2
has zeroes o the diagonal and nonnegative entries on the diagonal. We have to solve the
equations z12 = (u0 + u1) ab
0 and z21 = (u0 + u2) a
0b.
If ab0 = 0, we have a = 0 and a0 = 1 or b0 = 0 and b = 1. Then z12 = 0, in the rst case by
(1)0 and in the second case by (4)0. If a0b = 0 we nd that z21 = 0.
We dene u0 = u1 = 0 if ab
0 = 0 and u0 = u2 = 0 if a
0b = 0. In other cases we take



















g. Then it is easy to check that
z11   (u0 + u1 + u2) a
0b0  0 and z22   (u0 + u1 + u2) ab  0:
This completes the proof. /
Remark If any of the numbers a, b, a0 or b0 vanishes, the matrices Z1 and Z2 become
correlated equilibria associated with Nash equilibria, and Z(A00; B00) = ch E(A00; B00) once
again. So, only if a, b, a0 and b0 are positive, the set Z(A00; B00) has two extreme points Z 01
and Z 02 (the updates of Z1 and Z2) that are not Nash equilibria and three extreme points
corresponding to Nash equilibria. Note that Z1 + Z2 = Z0 + a
0b0 E11 + abE22. So none
of the generators of the cone are in the cone generated by the remaining elements. This
implies that all matrices E11, E22, Z0, Z1 and Z2 are extreme directions of the cone and




2 are indeed the extreme points of Z(A
00; B00).













































































Conclusion For almost all 2  2-bimatrix games the set of correlated equilibria equals
the convex hull of the equilibrium set. Only if the game has three isolated equilibria the
set of extreme points of Z(A;B) consists of the three Nash equilibria and two additional
points, not corresponding to a Nash equilibrium.
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